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Abstract
The weblog from theaviationist.com on Aug 13, 2014 noted that an Air Force
aircraft taking part in strikes against Taliban leaders in Afghanistan was monitored
and tracked via open source Internet methods. During the flight, the Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) transmitter was unintentionally turned
on. In sensitive mission operations, such as air operations in theater, the broadcasting
of ADS-B messages poses a serious security concern, but the small message payload of
ADS-B transmissions renders encryption standards such as AES unsuitable. Format-
preserving encryption, a technique already in use on small message sizes such as credit
card numbers, provides a suitable implementation of strong symmetric key encryption
for the military context.
This research proposes a Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) system which utilizes a bump-
in-the-wire approach for encryption and decryption of ADS-B messages. SADS-B
is a proof-of-concept, real-time encryption/decryption system utilizing the format-
preserving encryption algorithm FFX. This research details the design of the SADS-
B system and characterizes the prototype’s performance using the following metrics:
detection and error rates, operational latency, and utilization of resources on the
underlying field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware.
Findings include sub-millisecond operational latency for each encryption and de-
cryption, full data rate throughput capability for ADS-B, and approximately 50%
utilization of the available FPGA resources. Overall, findings suggest that a layered
security system such as SADS-B is suitable for increasing the security of ADS-B use
in the military context.
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DESIGN AND CHARACTERIZATION OF A SECURE AUTOMATIC
DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-BROADCAST PROTOTYPE
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
On August 10, 2014, a USAF E-11A aircraft circling the Ghazni region of Afghanistan
could be tracked by anyone in the world with Internet access [3]. Figure 1 is a screen
capture of what an Internet browser would have displayed. According to the web-
site The Guardian, there was a coincident NATO attack in the region [12]. The
E-11A aircraft was transmitting an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) signal during its flight, which contains its precise location information,
thus allowing any nearby ADS-B receiver to be used to track the location of the
aircraft during a combat mission.
Figure 1. Open source flight track of military aircraft [3].
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In sensitive mission operations, such as air operations in theater, the broad-
casting of ADS-B messages poses a serious security concern [17, 18, 20]. Previous
research has evaluated the possibility of encrypting the data contained in ADS-B
messages [1, 11], identifying the expected utility of some various symmetric key en-
cryption algorithms.
ADS-B is one of the major component systems of Next Generation Air Trans-
portation System (NextGen), a phased upgrade program being rolled out by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve the robustness of United States
National Airspace System (NAS). The benefits of NextGen are notable, as it has
the potential to improve the efficiency and safety of commercial flight in the United
States. ADS-B specifically increases the precision of positioning information avail-
able to everyone equipped, by collecting Global Positioning System (GPS) position
information and broadcasting it to the surrounding area.
The United States Air Force (USAF) has identified benefits from implement-
ing and using ADS-B, centered on enhanced safety and mission effectiveness [13].
While commercial aircraft may fly in close proximity out of necessity due to re-
stricted and/or crowded airspace around an airport, military aircraft often inten-
tionally operate at close proximity, sometimes for long periods of time in such mis-
sion areas as formation flying and air refueling [13]. Radar is the primary sensor
used for automatically retrieving position information about other aircraft, and
its precision is weak. The result is the need for verbal adjustments between pilots
based on visual contact. ADS-B, if implemented and integrated into planning and
tracking and navigation, has the potential to increase mission safety, effectiveness,
and efficiency in areas like air refueling.
However, NextGen in such a military context presents security challenges across
the fundamental aspects of security: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenti-
2
cation, and non-repudiation. The FAA has directly acknowledged security weak-
nesses in confidentiality and authentication [8]. Some prior work has started to ad-
dress weaknesses in the underlying ADS-B system, including in a military context.
Recently, research has illuminated format-preserving encryption (FPE) as a mecha-
nism to provide confidentiality and also integrity to an extent [10]. Follow-up work
was also conducted to evaluate a potential hardware design in simulation [1].
1.2 Problem Statement
This research presents the design, development, and testing of a proof-of-concept
Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) prototype, operable in two modes: either (1) as part of
the transmit chain, capable of receiving an ADS-B message, encrypting it, and
transmitting a SADS-B message in its place, or (2) as part of the receive chain, ca-
pable of receiving a SADS-B message, decrypting it, and transmitting the original
ADS-B message.
1.3 Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to design, develop and characterize a complete
SADS-B prototype, through the following steps:
• Design and develop SADS-B prototype system
• Verify correctness of prototype implementation (system and component-level)
• Evaluate the performance of prototype
– latency (system and component-level)
– preamble synchronization component
– bit-level pulse-position modulation (PPM) demodulator
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• Evaluate required field-programmable gate array (FPGA) resources for full
data rate implementation of Format-preserving Feistel-based Encryption (FFX)
1.4 Approach
The research objectives are approached systematically using an incremental ap-
proach through a series of analysis, modeling and simulation, hardware simulation,
and hardware verification. The system builds on previous research conducted by
Finke [11], which validated a suitable FFX implementation. To complete the full
bump-in-the-wire (BITW) concept, additional digital components are necessary.
For these components, the MATLAB® 2014b programming environment was used
to develop, analyze and model finite impulse response (FIR) designs for synchro-
nization, demodulation, Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) validation, packet gener-
ation, and modulation. The hardware design for each component is then developed,
including fully unrolled encryption and decryption engines. Using Active-HDL®
9.3 and ModelSim® 10.4, each component design is then simulated and verified,
followed by the end-to-end design. Finally, Xilinx ISE 14.7 Design Suite is used to
implement the verified design in hardware on a Kintex-7K410T FPGA, onboard a
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP™) X310 which normally operates as a
Software-Defined Radio (SDR). The top level FPGA design of the X310 is modified
to support standalone operation, more representative of the BITW use case. Addi-
tionally, the FPGA resources (Look-Up Tables (LUTs), registers and memory) con-
sumed by the SADS-B modules are evaluation using results reported in ISE Design
Suite.
To assess performance, external analysis of the hardware systems using an
Keysight N5182B MXG Vector Signal Generator and a Teledyne LeCroy 760Zi-A
oscilloscope are used to retrieve a true operational latency of the system. Finally, a
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second USRP™ is used alongside the N5182B to assess the operational throughput.
The results are assessed in the context of ADS-B specifications [21] and in compari-
son to the findings of previous research utilizing an iterative looping design [1].
1.5 Organization
Chapter II provides an in-depth literature review on the use of ADS-B within
NextGen, discusses previous research which addressed security issues with NextGen,
and the hardware platform on which the SADS-B prototype will be developed.
Chapter III details the SADS-B prototype system, as well as underlying algorithms
developed during the course of this research. Chapter IV first describes the method-
ology for verification and assessing the performance of the SADS-B prototype. Then
it presents the results, discussion, and analysis for verification and performance.
Lastly, Chapter V contains a summary of contributions as a result of this research,
conclusions drawn from it, and recommendations for future SADS-B research.
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II. Background
This chapter presents necessary background information to provide a context
for assessment and characterization of a SADS-B prototype. It summarizes the
emergence of ADS-B at part of systemic upgrade to Air Traffic Control (ATC) in
the United States, followed by details about previous work in augmenting the se-
curity of ADS-B including encryption techniques. Last, this chapter provides an
overview of the hardware platform on which the prototype is developed and imple-
mented.
2.1 National Airspace System
The primary purposes of ATC are to prevent collisions between aircraft and to
provide a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic [9]. For flights under the
18,000 ft level, called Flight Level 180 (FL180), the pilot has the responsibility to
maintain safe flying distance from other aircraft. This lower altitude traffic is also
referred to as Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. For flights above FL180, called In-
strument Flight Rules (IFR) traffic, the federal government is responsible for ATC
and has been since the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The FAA is the organization
delegated the responsibility of handling ATC, and they use the NAS system to do
so. The NAS is a collection of facilities, system, equipment, procedures, and air-
ports operated by thousands of ground-based personnel [7]. There are 690 ATC
facilities with associated systems and equipment to provide radar and communica-
tion service, divided into 21 regions, each with their own Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC). The Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) is
the headquarters over all the ARTCCs. There are two main influences that drive
decisions: traffic congestion and weather. When actions need to be taken to mod-
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ify traffic flow, it happens through airline personnel, traffic management specialists,
and air traffic controllers.
For the NAS to be effective, it needs location information (position, heading,
altitude) for all IFR traffic, at all times. This has been primarily accomplished
through the use of radar (providing range and azimuth data) and Mode C (pro-
viding altitude information). However, there are significant limitations to this ap-
proach. First, voice communication with a pilot are the means of control for an air
traffic controller. Second, long-range Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSRs) can
only typically cover a 200 NM radius and are expensive to maintain [7]. There are
only about 100 ARSRs in operation in the United States. Additionally, navigation
aid facilities (NAVAIDs) provide beacons that increase the available airspace, pro-
viding a means to connect between radar sites. Nonetheless, flights at IFR altitudes
are restricted to routes that overfly NAVAIDs or ARSRs, leading to many funnel
points in the network. This is especially true near airports, where there are often
only one or two NAVAIDs for departing aircraft to egress past.
Radar only refreshes approximately once every 12 seconds, and has a margin
of error of 300m. A more accurate and accessible source of position information is
GPS, which has been around since 1973. When GPS is augmented with ionospheric
correction data from Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), it can accurately
estimate position within 2 meters [7]. Additionally, all IFR aircraft are already re-
quired by the FAA to have GPS receivers onboard.
2.2 NextGen
The future vision of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
program relaxes many of the restrictions on IFR flight due to mechanisms that re-
duce reliance on radar. Several technologies are needed to achieve this end vision.
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NextGen includes technologies such as performance based navigation, low visibil-
ity aids, and electronic flight bag [23]. It also establishes data communications that
reduce the amount of required verbal communication between air traffic controllers
and pilots. Finally, NextGen adds a system that automatically delivers high preci-
sion GPS data to both pilots and air traffic controllers. This system is called Au-
tomatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), and it has the potential to
eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, reliance on radar.
2.3 ADS-B
As the name suggests, ADS-B automatically transmits position information,
dependent on GPS, to surveillance stations (i.e. air traffic controllers) via data
broadcast. ADS-B consists of two major subsystems: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In.
ADS-B Out is the broadcast message (by an aircraft, vehicle, or ground radio sta-
tion) containing an aircraft identifier and the GPS-based latitude, longitude, and
altitude positioning information. ADS-B In is the receiving end, implemented by
air traffic controllers and aircraft alike, enabling reception and display of nearby
vehicles without reliance on radar.
Because ADS-B Out was designed to be universal, it is not encrypted in any
way. The message format for an ADS-B Out broadcast is shown in Figure 2. The
cleartext transmission of this data presents a security risk. As described in Sec-
tion 1.1, this risk is especially true in military operations that are sensitive, such
as combat operations.
Figure 2. ADS-B DF-17 message format [21].
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2.4 Related Work
Prior research efforts have made progress towards more secure implementations
of ADS-B, specifically utilizing the DF-17 message which is the primary ADS-B
Out message in use by the USAF.
The Communications Security (COMSEC) vulnerabilities associated with ADS-
B were identified by Purton et al [20], and later expounded upon by McCallie [18],
elaborating on the Operational Security (OPSEC) issues with a military-specific fo-
cus. Magazu illustrated the simplicity of performing an injection attack using SDR,
an inexpensive Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) piece of equipment [17].
The path to encryption began with Jochum [15], who proposed using symmet-
ric key cryptography to encrypt the message payload during sensitive operations
and tailored the recommendation around the use of the DF-19 header code, which
is already reserved for military use in the ADS-B specifications [21]. Finke affirmed
the plausibility of using this type of cryptography, and analyzed the theoretical im-
plementation of FPE to handle the unusual bit width of messages [11]. Finally, Ag-
beyibor confirmed the strength of three different FPE algorithms, simulating an
FPGA-based design and assessing expected FPGA resources required.
2.5 Format Preserving Encryption
The need to encrypt cleartext communications containing position information
in a military context is not new. Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a com-
mercial system used to receive and transmit position information for sea vessels,
similar to the function of ADS-B for aircraft. Like ADS-B, messages are transmit-
ted in cleartext, but with a message length of 128-bits. To keep its transmissions
confidential, NATO created Warship-Automatic Identification System (W-AIS),
which encapsulates and encrypts one or more AIS messages as its payload (in incre-
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ments of 128-bits, up to a maximum of 896 bits), prior to broadcast [14]. Other W-
AIS receivers are able decrypt the messages (using a symmetric key) and relay the
identification and position information to the display console. W-AIS may directly
use Blowfish or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithms, as both algo-
rithms have been approved and are well suited for the 128-bit AIS message length.
Figure 3. FFX encryption structure [2].
However, ADS-B has a much shorter 112-bit fixed-length message, requiring
the use of format-preserving encryption (FPE). In general, FPE algorithms are
not dependent on a specific message size or format to be effective. More specifi-
cally, they will generate a ciphertext in the same radix and number of digits as the
plaintext input, regardless of the key size utilized. The FPE algorithm evaluated
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by Finke for use with ADS-B is FFX [11], shown in its generalized form graphically
in Figure 3. FK (as shown in the Algorithm 1) is a one-way function that gives the
encryption method its strength.
Algorithm 1 Function F using CBC-MAC of AES [11]
function F(n, T, i, B)
vers← 1; t← |T | in bytes
P ← [vers]2 ‖ [method]1 ‖ [addition]1 ‖ [radix]1 ‖ [n]1 ‖ [split(n)]1 ‖ [rnds(n)]1 ‖ [t]8
Q← T ‖ [0]−t−9mod16 ‖ [i]1 ‖ 064−|B| ‖ B
Y ←CBC-MAC(P ‖ Q)
return Y [129− split(n)..128]
end function
function CBC-MAC(m1 ‖ m2)
X ← AESK(m1 XOR 0)
Y ← AESK(m2 XOR X)
return Y
end function
⊲ Note: [s]i denotes the i-byte string that encodes the number s
The function FK used for FFX by Finke is an implementation of AES. The
128-bit implementation used performs a truncation step, making it a one-way func-
tion. The implementation is maximally balanced, with 52 bits in each half of the
Feistel structure, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. FFX bits superimposed on ADS-B DF-17 message [11].
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2.6 USRP™ X310
Ettus Research’s USRP™ X310 is a highly customizable FPGA-based radio re-
ceiver transmitter. The USRP™ devices typically function as a SDR, as depicted
in Figure 5. That is, they function as a slave to a master personal computer (PC)
running GNU Radio, which controls the sample rate, tuning, digital down conver-
sion (DDC), and digital up conversion (DUC) in real time. All other processing
(such as a generating a spectrogram from the data) is accomplished on the master
PC. For example, in receive mode, after the DDC chain, in-phase (I) and quadra-
ture (Q) samples are transmitted over the Ethernet connection (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. USRP™ X310 receive and transmit processing chains [6].
A similar model (the USRP™ N210) was previously used by Magazu [17] in
creating a fake flight track of ADS-B messages.
The X Series, shown in Figure 6, are higher sample rate devices with a more
capable FPGA, the Xilinx Kintex-7. Additionally, Ettus Research has made the
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Figure 6. USRP™ X310 [6].
hardware description language (HDL) source code available for modification. Writ-
ten in Verilog, the availability of the source code is essential, as a PC-peripheral
device would suit the intended purpose as an avionics prototype. To overcome this
limitation, the SADS-B module will be developed in Very High Speed Integrated
Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) and implemented alongside the
provided source code.
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III. System Design and Implementation
This chapter begins with a high-level concept and minimum performance re-
quirements for the SADS-B prototype system, based on ADS-B specifications [21].
It then delves into the design specifics and implementation details of the system.
3.1 BITW Concept
Along the lines of W-AIS, SADS-B will modify a normal ADS-B message (as in
Figure 2 on page 8) by encrypting the bits shown in Figure 4 on page 11. In a final
implmentation, this would most likely be implemented by modifying an existing
ADS-B transponder, but for proof of concept purposes and to provide an interim
approach, a BITW approach is suitable.
Figure 7. BITW concept diagram.
As defined in IETF RFC4949, bump-in-the-wire (BITW) is “An implementa-
tion approach that places a network security mechanism outside of the system that
is to be protected” [22]. Figure 7 illustrates a system with a set of paired BITW
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devices that perform a security function between two legacy devices. The legacy de-
vices need no special configuration or context in order to communicate through the
BITW device. A widely used implementation of a BITW security approach is Inter-
net Protocol Security (IPSec) devices between Internet Protocol (IP) routers that
need to traverse an untrustworthy connection. The packets are transmitted to the
IPSec devices, which encapsulate and encrypt the received packet before transmit-
ting it across the Internet.
In the context of ADS-B transmission, the ADS-B Out is intercepted by the
BITW encryptor, translating the signal to a secure signal, SADS-B Out. The re-
verse occurs on the receiving end. The proof-of-concept prototype resulting from
this research serves either as the SADS-B Encryptor, SADS-B Decryptor, or both.
Figure 8. BITW approach to securing ADS-B.
Because the BITW encryption and decryption only apply to specific messages
(DF-17) messages, an important option is the pass-through of the received signal.
This would allow the pass-through of all other messages (ADS-B or other) on the
1090 MHz frequency.
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3.2 Latency Requirement
The ADS-B system is not packet-based, as it functions through broadcast mes-
sages. The messages are also time-sensitive, as the FAA DO-260B specification [21]
specifies a 100 ms window for ADS-B position messages. Further, the receiver itself
is specified as having ± 50 ms tolerance, which leaves only 50 ms maximum allow-
able operational latency for the SADS-B BITW device.
The in-line BITW architecture, low latency, and pass-through capability re-
quirements for an effective SADS-B prototype support the use of an FPGA-based
hardware environment.
3.3 Sampling Rate
For any digitally sampled signal, the minimum required sampling rate, Fs,min,
is twice the analog bit rate, according to the sampling theorem. In the case of PPM,
two samples are simply needed to determine the location of the pulse: in the first or
second half of a bit frame. In ADS-B, the PPM bit rate is 1 Mb/s, so the required
Fs,min is 2 MS/s.
Oversampling is an effective means to reduce receiver noise in digital systems.
Oversampling effectively increases the resolution bandwidth β =
Fs
2
, causing the
noise N0 to reduce, per Equation 1, where N is the noise power.
N = N0β (1)
It can also be construed in terms of noise power per sample Nsample, according to
Equation 2, where M is the oversampling factor.
Nsample = N0M (2)
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Section I.4.1.1 of DO-260B recommends an oversampling factor of at least
4, but recommends 5 or more based on tests conducted by RTCA, Inc [21]. The
SADS-B prototype design in this research follows this recommendation with an
oversampling factor of 5, such that Fs = 10 MS/s. Each pulse width used for sam-
pling is 5 samples. During both preamble detection and demodulation, the edge
samples (samples adjacent to transition zones) are ignored. Figure 9 depicts the
Figure 9. Possible conditions during sampling for PPM.
driving factor for this, being the potential for anomalies (i.e. increased noise) in
samples in transition zones. As a mechanism to reduce this noise, the samples near-
est the transition zones are ignored. This reduces the effective oversampling rate to
3, again following the recommendations from the enhanced detection guidelines in
Section I.4.1.1 of DO-260B [21].
3.4 Top-Level Design
Figure 10 shows the top level design of the USRP™ X310, modified for use as
the SADS-B prototype. The SADS-B Module as depicted in Figure 10 is the top-
level VHDL component, which is the overall focus of this chapter.
The built-in analog components in the USRP™ SBX-40 daughtercard perform
coarse tuning for the Mode S carrier frequency of 1090 MHz. The frequency re-
sponse for the circuit is shown in Figure 49 in Appendix A. This is performed by
setting a specific controller on the board, which drives a numerically controlled os-
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Figure 10. SADS-B top level design. Modified from [6].
cillator (NCO) to mix the 1090 MHz signal down to baseband. It is then passed
through a 40 MHz anti-aliasing low-pass filter (LPF) before conversion to digital
in the analog to digital converter (ADC) component, from which the I and Q data
are transmit to the FPGA at a sampling rate of 200 MS/s. This level of sampling is
unnecessary for the 1 Mb/s PPM signal of ADS-B, so the next step is to downsam-
ple the the signal.
Internal to the FPGA, Ettus Research has already designed configurable DDC,
required for normal operation of the USRP™ when it operates in SDR mode, as
previously shown in Figure 5 on page 12. These Verilog-based HDL components are
suitable for use in the SADS-B prototype design. In the Ettus Research DDC de-
sign, downsample occurs through three successive rounds of filtering through a LPF
followed by downsampling. The LPF in each step is set to a stop band frequency
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of the 1
2
the inverse of the downsample rate for that step, as in Equation 3, where
Fs is the input sampling rate for that downsample step and M is the downsample
factor.
B =
Fs
2M
(3)
In the Ettus DDC design, the first two steps are either turned on or off with
a hard set downsample rate of 2. The third downsample step is always on, with a
configurable integer downsample rate. For example, in the case of a target sam-
ple rate of
200
20
= 10MS/s, as discussed in the next section, the steps would be
[ON,ON,5], equating to a downsampling factor of 2× 2× 5 = 20.
In the output chain, the order of operations is essentially reversed. Three sim-
ilarly configurable interpolation steps bring the sample rate back up to 200 MS/s
from 10 MS/s. First interpolation step is configurable by integer factor, which is
again set to 5. The next two steps are a factor of 2, and both are set to “on.” Af-
ter each interpolation step, there is an interpolation filter, which removes high fre-
quency noise. The stop band for this filter is set according to Equation 3, where Fs
is the output sampling rate after upsampling.
The FPGA-based SADS-B subsystem, which is the focus of this thesis, consists
of two modules: the SADS-B Encryption Module and SADS-B Decryption Module.
While similar, there are differences primarily in packetization and CRC validation.
The block diagrams are shown in Figures 11 and 12, respectively.
The clock rate for all the components in the design is the native FPGA 200
MHz clock. Every block shown in the functional block diagrams in Figures 11 and
12 have clock inputs (200 MHz) and clock enable inputs (10 MHz) that drive the
operation of the components (not shown in the diagram).
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Figure 11. Functional block diagram for the SADS-B encryption module.
Figure 12. Functional block diagram for the SADS-B decryption module.
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3.5 Preamble Detection and Synchronization
The preamble for ADS-B, shown in Figure 13, is 8 µs in duration. It has 4
pulses, with each pulse width the same .5 µs as that of a pulse from the ADS-B
data block.
Figure 13. PPM structure of ADS-B preamble and data block [21].
Normally, a matched filter could be used to correlate the incoming signal with
the preamble template. The discrete form of a matched filter is shown in Equation
4, given a preamble of length K samples, where x[k] is the value of the kth previous
sample, h[n − k] is the kth coefficient in the reverse impulse response of the dis-
cretized preamble template, and y[n] is the correlation value at sample n. In this
format, K = T ∗ Fs where T is the length of the preamble in seconds and Fs is the
sampling rate.
y[n] =
K∑
k=0
h[n− k]x[k] (4)
The downsampled sampling rate used for the SADS-B system is 10 MS/s, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, so h[n− k] would consist of 80 coefficients, the graph of which
is horizontally mirrored against the preamble. The preamble detector would trigger
the start of the signal, nstart where y[n] is at its local maximum above a threshold
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correlation value C, according to Equation 5.
nstart = ny[n],max where y[n] > C (5)
In the case of this preamble, as shown in Figure 14, each of the 0.5 µs pulses would
have coefficients with a value of 1. As this is a PPM signal, all other positions are
“off” and would have coefficients with a value of 0.
Figure 14. Timing of ADS-B preamble pulses.
However, the use of a matched filter breaks down when using any zero-valued
coefficients. In this case, 3/4 of the coefficients are zero, and only 1/4 of the avail-
able samples would provide input to the correlation value. This results in false de-
tections, as any received energy between 1070-1110 MHz for 5 µs would appear as a
match. To correct for this, all coefficients where h[i] = 0 coefficients are converted
to h[i] = −1. This more correctly utilizes the negative spaces between pulses to
assist in the proper rejection of false preambles.
A second consideration for the modified matched filter design is scaling. While
a clean signal with high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (defined as Eb/N0) works well
with the modified matched filter, there is also a high correlation value at the tail
of the ADS-B signal itself, in some cases. The worst possible scenario is shown
in Figure 15, where the filter aligns with the end of an ADS-B signal ending in
[...,1,1,X,0,0], with X representing either a ”1” or a ”0”. Both cases are shown.
These bits are part of the Parity/Interrogator Identity (PI) field in a DF-17
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Figure 15. Worst case alignment of preamble with signal for a matched filter.
message, which is a 24-bit CRC. As such, each of the last 5 bits are then uniformly
random between 0 and 1. The probability that [1,1,X,0,0] are the last 5 bits of any
given ADS-B extended squitter (1090ES) message is p =
1
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= 6.25% To be prob-
lematic, this situation must have occurred when the proper preamble was not de-
tected. ADS-B has no channel access control, such as Time Division Multiple Ac-
cess (TDMA) or Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), built in to the pro-
tocol, nor is there any collision detection. Therefore, the likelihood of interference
during a preamble but not during the end of a signal is non-negligible.
A heuristic to account for this expected occurrence is to adjust the threshold
value C. A high threshold value C would result in more of these occurrences being
rejected, but also falsely rejects more low-SNR preambles. The inverse would be
true in low threshold value C.
An alternative approach is to increase the penalty for received signal power in
the null (zero power or “off”) regions of the preamble template shown in Figure 14.
In other words, only scaling the negative coefficients by a penalty factor α and leav-
ing the positive coefficients as +1, resulting in the modified correlation Equation
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6.
y[n] =
K∑
k=0
(α(h[n− k]− 1) + 1)x[k] (6)
A consideration for setting the value of α in the preamble detector for SADS-B
design is the worst case scenario for a matched filter, shown in Figure 15, where 4
pulses correctly align with the positive coefficients in h[n− k] while 1 pulse is in the
null region. Even when using -1 coefficients for the null regions would result in a
strong correlation for such a scenario. However, if using a penalty factor set α > 4,
the single pulse in the null region would negate the otherwise strong correlation
value allowing a correct rejection of the false preamble.
Figure 16. Pipelined FIR filter design [19].
The design utilizes a pipelined FIR filter, with a generic design as shown in
Figure 16. In larger pipelined FIR filter designs, the total latency from multiplying
and adding may be too great for the clock rate. Given the sampling rate, there is
an 80-sample window for preamble correlation, which equates to an 80-order FIR
filter. Running on the USRP™ X310’s 200 MHz clock, it is not possible to complete
a multiply operation and 80 adds in a single clock cycle.
In general, additional registers may be added in a FIR design between some
registers and combinational adders, as in Figure 17, or by converting the adder
structure from linear to a hierarchical, or chain-out, design. The design for the
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Figure 17. Pipelined FIR filter design with a delay [19].
preamble correlator uses a chain-out design, as shown in Figure 18, with the ad-
dition of registers (not shown) between each level of the hierarchy to meet FPGA
timing constraints.
Figure 18. Pipelined FIR chain-out design used for correlator and demodulator.
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3.6 PPM Demodulation
In the demodulation step, a simple integrate and dump FIR filter is used, also
according to the diagram in Figure 18, with +1 and -1 coefficients according to the
‘0’ PPM bit with the pulse in the first half of the bit frame. The demodulated bit
is simply the most significant bit (MSB) of the resulting signed Yout value. As a
result of only using the center 3 values of each pulse width (as discussed in Section
3.4), the coefficients for this FIR filter are [0,-1,-1,-1,0,0,1,1,1,0].
3.7 Packetization and CRC Validation
In the SADS-B Encryption Module, the packetizer occurs immediately follow-
ing the PPM demodulator. It consists of a 112-bit buffer, which shifts in bits as
they are output from the demodulator, at a rate of 1 Mb/s or once every 10 sam-
ples.
As the inputs are shifted in, they are also input into a CRC validation compo-
nent, which is an instantiation of the serial version of the Ultimate CRC (UCRC)
intellectual property (IP) Core [5]. UCRC is initialized during synthesis with the
CRC-24 polynomial in Equation 7, coming from the ADS-B specification [21].
P (x) = x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x19 + x18 + x17 + x16 + x15 + x14 + x1 (7)
Each time a sample is shifted into UCRC, the computed CRC remainder is up-
dated. When the value of the remainder is 0, the match_o signal of UCRC is set
high, indicating the CRC matches. An output register in the packetizer is updated
whenever match_o is set high. Then the output valid signal in the packetizer turns
is set high for a clock enable period, enabling the next component, the FFX encryp-
tor.
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3.8 FFX Encryption
The encryption design implements the FFX-A2 algorithm according to the pa-
rameters radix=2, length=104, method=2, split=52, rounds=12, according to the
parameters used in Finke [11]. It does so using a fully-pipelined implementation,
in contrast with an iterative looping version in previous research [1]. This has a
greater impact on decryption and is discussed in more detail in Section 3.9.
As a valid packet sample is received from the packetizer, as shown in Figure 11
on page 20, it is broken into the header bits (the first 8 bits: the Downlink Format
(DF) and Capability (CA) fields), and the encryption plaintext (the remaining 104
bits).
The header is passed around the encryption module unchanged using a delay
buffer with 8-bit width and equal in length to the number of clock cycles required
to complete an encryption. The output of the header delay buffer is passed directly
into the modulator component.
Internal to the FFX encryption component, there are layers of similar delay
buffers. Each round of the Feistel structure (recall Figure 3 from page 10) con-
sists of a one way Fk function. The Fk function is detailed in Algorithm 1. There
are two AES [4] rounds (yielding X and then Y ), according to the Fk algorithm.
The AES core utilized was designed by Pranav Patel of the Air Force Institute of
Technology and was verified during previous research [16]. Because of the pipelined
structure, a delay buffer is required to keep Q available until the first encryption
completes, generating P ‘. Additionally, this structure also requires 24 AES cores
(2 per round) across the given the 12-round implementation. Consequently, with
all the other FPGA components involved in prototyping an SADS-B system, this
structure requires more resources than the Kintex-7 has available (the initial design
overmapped the FPGA by 7%. The following optimization is thus implemented to
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reduce the number of required cores to 13 from 24. The first AES operation in each
round is identical, effectively reproducing P ‘ every round. Therefore, the first round
will produce P ‘ and provide it as an output to each subsequent round, as shown in
Figure 19. Note that the d block is a delay buffer for Q.
Figure 19. First round of FFX Encryption in the unrolled design.
Each subsequent round is then altered to take in an extra P ‘ input, allowing
11 out of the 12 instances of Fk to have only one AES core, as shown in Figure 20.
This has the added benefit of eliminating the need for delay buffers inside Fk in
other rounds, and also reduces the length of other delay buffers across the entire
design.
Figure 20. Other rounds of FFX Encryption in the unrolled design.
Given the unrolled and fully pipelined structure of the SADS-B modules, delay
buffers are used in each round of FFX according to the block labeled d in Figure
21. The figure highlights the operation of two rounds of encryption in the design,
out of twelve.
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Figure 21. Two example rounds of FFX Encryption.
3.9 FFX Decryption
One benefit of utilizing a Feistel structure in an encryption scheme is the com-
mon design for encryption and decryption. In the case of FFX as implemented for
ADS-B, there is only one small adjustment that needs to be made. The design is
identical to that described in Section 3.8, except that n = (12 − i) instead of n = i
for the Fk function in a given encryption round, inputs C||B instead of A||B, and
outputs B||A. All as shown in the decryption diagram in Figure 22.
The fully pipelined aspect of the overall design becomes especially important
for decryption. In the SADS-B Decryption Module, the packetizer cannot perform
CRC validation, as the bit stream is encrypted, including the parity field containing
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Figure 22. Two example rounds of FFX Decryption.
the CRC. Therefore, every valid sample from the PPM demodulator is shifted into
the packetizer, which updates its 112-bit output signal and pulses the output valid
signal for one clock cycle. Therefore, every sample (bit) from the PPM Demodu-
lator results in a decryption, which could sometimes be from overlapping signals.
Only after the decryption is performed on any given 112-bit sequence can the CRC
validation step occur, as depicted in Figure 12 on page 20.
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3.10 PPM Modulation
3.10.1 Encryption Version.
PPM modulation in the SADS-B Encryption Module is straight forward. Us-
ing Figure 12 as a reference, when the i_rdy signal is high, the 112-bit (encrypted)
i_data packet is stored in a 112-bit vector. Then, on each subsequent clock enable
(10 MS/s), the bits are shifted out in order (DF bits first), converted to I and Q
data in o_I and o_Q, respectively, while the o_valid signal is set high for one clock
enable period. Because the PPM signal is phase agnostic, each pulse I and Q are
set to 25% of the dynamic range, 216/4 = 0x(4000) and a negative space is set to
0x(0000).
The modulation begins with a proper preamble, and o_valid set high. Given
the 10 MS/s sample, there are 80 I and Q samples generated before any actual bits
are modulated from the 112-bit vector. There are 4 sets of 5-sample pulses that
are modulated, according to the offsets shown in Figure 14 on page 22. After the
preamble has been modulated, each data bit (starting with the DF-17 header) is
then converted to a 10-sample PPM frame using a counter with simple logic. When
the last bit has been modulated, o_valid returns low.
3.10.2 Decryption Version.
In the SADS-B Decryption Module, the additional step of CRC validation oc-
curs before the modulation into I and Q occurs. Again, using an instance of the
serial UCRC component, the CRC value is checked as the bits are shifted out of the
112-bit input vector into the UCRC component [5]. Simultaneously, they are also
shifted into a second 112-bit vector, which acts as an output buffer. When the last
sample is shifted into the UCRC checker, the o_match signal from UCRC should go
high, indicating a CRC match. If this occurs (and the packet has been validated),
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the output buffer will empty as it is converted into to the 10 MS/s modulation sig-
nal described above in Section 3.10.1.
3.11 ADS-B Selector
The ADS-B Selector component in both the SADS-B Encryption Module and
Decryption Module is not an instantiated component like the other functional blocks
shown in Figures 11 and 12 from page 20. It consists of a simple buffer for the in-
put I, Q, and strobe signals, equal in length (cycle count) to the rest of the design.
This allows the input signal to be seamlessly passed through the SADS-B module
for all cases where i_valid no signal modification is occurring.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter details the process used to verify and characterize the SADS-B
prototype, according to accuracy, latency, and FPGA resource utilization. It then
presents and evaluates the results.
4.1 Verification Methodology
From the research goals outlined in Section 1.3, there are two aspects of verifi-
cation that were accomplished: component-level and system-level.
4.1.1 Component Verification.
Each major component is verified in several steps along the way to verifying
the system as a whole.
Figure 23. Component verification process.
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The diagram in Figure 23 depicts the overall process by which the compo-
nents were verified. At the algorithm level, an ideal stimulus vector is generated
(e.g. an ideal ADS-B message or PPM signal) in MATLAB®. The stimulus vector
is used as a test input for the component under test (CUT). The output from the
MATLAB® instantiation of that component (e.g. a preamble detector) is another
vector (e.g. the ADS-B data stream). The output vector is then be plotted or oth-
erwise used to verify the correctness of the CUT design at the algorithm level.
Second, the stimulus vector is used to generate the stimulus file for the design
verification. The stimulus file is a text file that contains a single numerical data
sample on each line. Additionally, a VHDL test bench file is also needed to per-
form three functions:(1) provide simulated input to the hardware, (2) instantiate
the CUT, and (3) record the output of the simulation. The input and output oc-
cur by means of simulation-only VHDL components. These components, the data
source and data sink, read input from a specified file or write output to a specified
file, respectively. Active-HDL® or ModelSim® use the test bench design to simu-
late the operation of the CUT. An example of a stimulus file would be a set of [I,Q]
data inputs to the preamble detector or PPM demodulator. The data source reads
one line from the stimulus file (typically 16-bit integer format), and supplies the
data as input to the CUT, once per clock cycle. The data sink converts the output
of the CUT to a numerical value, and writes it to a file, once per simulated clock
cycle.
Third, the stimulus vector is used to drive the signal generator for hardware
and timing verification. For testing purposes, an additional Xilinx ISE ChipScope®
Pro HDL component is added into the design to monitor signals of interest to mon-
itor the operation of the CUT. As described in Section 2.6, ChipScope® Pro pro-
vides a mechanism to capture real-time data signals to an attached PC for static
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analysis. Alternatively, the signals may be verified using data capture tools avail-
able via the USRP™ top level code, using the GNU Radio command line tools.
After compilation of the design in Xilinx ISE, the design is programmed onto the
FPGA on the X310. Using MATLAB®, the stimulus vector is uploaded to the
Keysight N5182B signal generator using the Advanced Configuration and Power
Interface (ACPI) interface over the network. Depending on the method of capture,
either the Xilinx ISE Analyzer tool is used to control and retrieve data from the
ChipScope® Pro component, or the files captured via GNU Radio are loaded in
MATLAB® for static analysis.
Lastly, the outputs verification phases are compared to each other and/or ground
truth information to verify functional correctness of the CUT.
4.1.2 System Verification.
Encryption.
Figure 24. End-to-end verification in encryption mode.
System verification for SADS-B in encryption mode is accomplished using the
previously captured ADS-B signals from the Aeroflex IFR 6000. The signals have
approximately 80 µs of quiet surrounding the signal. Figure 25 shows a plot of the
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signal power for one of the Aeroflex ADS-B signals.
Figure 25. Example Aeroflex IFR 6000 signal.
Using an ACPI interface over a TCP/IP connection, MATLAB® is used to
upload one of the signals to the Keysight N5182B signal generator. The signal gen-
erator is then configured to continuously repeat the signal, which simplifies data
collection. With the repeating signal approximately 200 µs in length, any data cap-
ture of at least 400 µs will contain at least one complete ADS-B message.
In correct operation, the SADS-B prototype would receive the ADS-B Out sig-
nal from the signal generator and transmit the SADS-B Out signal. The next de-
vice in the chain is a second USRP™ acting as a SDR configured (using GNU Ra-
dio) according to the diagram shown in Figure 5. It is set as a simple receiver, sam-
pling as 10 MS/s, centered on 1090 MHz. The data is captured on the controlling
PC. The function of this USRP™ is to capture the SADS-B Out signal for verifica-
tion through static analysis in MATLAB®. The received data is in an interleaved
[I,Q] format, each of which are 32 bit precision floating point numbers.
The next step in MATLAB® is to setup the data for analysis. This consists of
de-interleaving the [I,Q] data, plotting, manual inspecting the plot for the signal,
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and cropping the signal down. The signal can then be analyzed by using the PPM
Demodulator MATLAB® model to retrieve the bits.
The recovered bits are compared with known ciphertext (determined previously
when verifying the FFX Encryptor component in Section 4.2.4.
Decryption.
Figure 26. End-to-end verification in decryption mode.
A similar process is followed for verification of the SADS-B prototype in de-
cryption mode, with a few modifications as depicted in Figure 26.
Specifically, the signal just captured during the Encryption test is used to drive
the N5182B vector signal generator. In the final step, instead of comparing with
the known ciphertext, a comparison is made with known plaintext.
4.2 Component Verification Results
Several captured files from an Aeroflex IFR 6000 are used to verify the pream-
ble detector. The captures are baseband I and Q data samples, saved in comma
separated value (CSV) format, at a a sample rate of 50 MS/s. The ADS-B values
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used to create the data are known, providing the basis for comparison throughout
verification.
4.2.1 Preamble Detection.
Modeling and Simulation.
For the MATLAB® simulation, the captured files are loaded, downsampled to
10 MS/s, and quantized to 16-bit samples using the MATLAB® Communications
System Toolbox™ function fi. The I and Q samples are combined into received
signal power, P = I2 +Q2.
Figure 27. MATLAB® results for preamble detection with α = 5.
The first plot in Figure 27 shows the resulting waveform plot of power over
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time. The second plot in Figure 27 shows the correlation coefficient y[n] (as dis-
cussed in Section 3.5) over time. The first local maximum aligns correctly to the
signal start at t = 3.08 ∗ 10−4 s, with a correlation value of y[n] = 5.61 ∗ 10−4.
39
Hardware Simulation.
In the case of the preamble detection, there are two stimulus files created by
the MATLAB® simulation. The files written contain the downsampled I and Q
data (10 MS/s), consisting of one sample per line in integer representation of the
signed 16-bit samples.
Figure 28. Hardware simulation results for preamble detection with α = 5.
Figure 28 shows the results of the simulation, via a screenshot of the simula-
tion interface in the Active HDL program. It shows the output valid signal o_valid
is correctly set high and low corresponding to the presence of the ADS-B data sig-
nal, for a period of exactly 112 µs. Additionally, it shows the timestamp of the ris-
ing edge of o_valid as 29,050 ns, which gives context to Figure 29.
Figure 29. Hardware simulation results zoomed in on preamble.
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In Figure 29, the 8 µs (8000 ns) preamble (shown in o_pwr) is exactly preced-
ing the sample that is classified as nstart, the beginning of the ADS-B data signal.
The o_valid also is set high in alignment with the first sample of the data sig-
nal and the peak correlation coefficient y[n] (shown as f_corr[2]). The output of
the synchronizer component during hardware simulation in Active-HDL® is a 1120
sample text file, where the first sample in the file is the first sample of the first data
bit of the ADS-B signal.
4.2.2 PPM Demodulation.
The demodulator only reads inputs when o_valid from the synchronizer is set
high. Recalling the top plot from Figure 27, the data input read by the demodula-
tor is essentially a shifted and clipped version, shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 30. Plot of synchronizer output as received into the demodulator.
Modeling and Simulation.
The demodulation output should be the 112 bits that this PPM signal rep-
resents. For verification in MATLAB®, the stimulus vector is the 1120 samples
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as plotted in Figure 30 and the output is a 112 bit vector. In this case, the sim-
plest mechanism to verify the bits are correct, aside from manual inspection, is
to parse the data values into the respective ADS-B fields and compare with the
ground truth data. However, the PI field containing the 24-bit CRC was not ex-
plicitly provided as input to the Aeroflex IFR 6000, but the ground truth for it is
calculated from the first 88 bits of the message. The Communications System Tool-
box™ in MATLAB® provides CRC utilities, which are utilized for this purpose.
The plot_sim_sync_output.m MATLAB® script is used to perform the parsing
and CRC calculation, then compare the results.
Figure 31. Verification output of PPM demodulation in MATLAB®.
The printout from the function is shown in Figure 31. As shown, the computed
CRC values match the demodulated bits. Additionally, the message data matches
known values.
Hardware Simulation.
The hardware simulation for demodulation verification is performed in ModelSim®,
using the 1120-sample stimulus file generated as output during synchronizer verifi-
cation. The output and enable signals are verified for correct timing. Additionally,
the final output is verified through static analysis using a MATLAB® script.
Figure 32 shows the results of the ModelSim® simulation. From the figure,
the period of the 1 µs (1000000 ps) is shown between samples. Also, the output
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Figure 32. ModelSim® 10.4 screenshot of demodulator verification.
samples are aligned with the peaks and valleys in the signal, indicating a correctly
implemented pipeline structure.
The output file captured_demod_signal.txt is analyzed using a similar script
from modeling and simulation verification. The plot_sim_demod_output.m per-
forms essentially the same steps as the plot_sim_sync_output.m previously used,
only instead of reading the input from a MATLAB® vector, the input is read in
from captured_demod_signal.txt file as output from the demodulator. The out-
put confirms the number of bits in addition to the correctness of the bits, all shown
in Figure 33.
Figure 33. Verification of demodulator hardware design output using MATLAB®.
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4.2.3 Packetization & CRC Validation.
Verification for the packetizer component is focused on hardware implementa-
tion, as there is a readily available CRC verification mechanism using the MATLAB®
Communications System Toolbox™ and the correct implementation of packetiza-
tion is essentially a hardware timing problem. Therefore, rather than generate an
explicit stimulus vector to verify the packetizer component, the test bench for hard-
ware verification consists of reusing the previous test bench for PPM demodulation,
with the outputs wired as the inputs for the packetizer.
Figure 34. ModelSim® 10.4 screenshot of packetizer verification.
Figure 34 shows the ModelSim® results for the described test bench. As the
last sample is output according to the demodulator’s o_valid signal, the CRC
matches (shown by w_matched_crc) and the output is correctly loaded into the
output register, o_data. The message in the test case is known, including the CRC
bits, which match the output shown.
4.2.4 FFX Encryption and Decryption.
There are no published test vectors for for verifying FFX encryption as there
are for other standards such as AES. However, many plaintext-ciphertext pairs were
generated by Finke in the evaluation of FFX for use in securing ADS-B during pre-
vious research [11]. These plaintext-ciphertext pairs will serve as the basis for veri-
fication for the implementation of FFX. As such, the verification for the encryption
and decryption components will be performend in hardware simulation.
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Figure 35. Screenshot of Finke test plaintext and ciphertext files [11].
Figure 35 shows an example plaintext/ciphertext pair that is used to verify the
SADS-B encryption and decryption components, where the 12R_bytes_1.txt file
contains the plaintext messages and e12R_bytes_1.txt contains the corresponding
ciphertext. As the ADS-B DF and CA fields are not encrypted, they are not shown
in the files. The encryption key for the test files is known and set statically prior to
simulation. The key is shown in Figure 36.
Figure 36. Screenshot of encryption component in ModelSim®.
For encryption verification, Figure 36 shows the plaintext message input and
the corresponding ciphertext output, aligned to the clock cycle when the output
valid o_cipher_text_rdy is set high. The input and output match the known
plaintext/ciphertext pair.
Similarly, for decryption, Figure 37 shows the ciphertext message input and the
corresponding plaintext output, aligned to the clock cycle when the output valid
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Figure 37. Screenshot of decryption component in ModelSim®.
o_p_text_rdy is set high.
4.2.5 PPM Modulation.
Figure 38. Screenshot of full modulation signal in Active-HDL®.
As with PPM demodulation, the verification for PPM modulation is focused on
timing implementation. Figure 38 shows the full signal timing of the output, which
is aligned to the output valid o_valid signal. Additionally, the period of the signal
is correct at 120 µs (including the preamble). Figure 39 shows the same simulation,
zoomed in on the preamble to verify its appropriate timing prior to bit modulation.
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Figure 39. Screenshot of modulation signal in Active-HDL®, zoomed on preamble
timing.
4.3 Performance Test Methodology
4.3.1 Evaluate End-to-End Latency.
Latency is a significant factor in achieving an operationally useful prototype
for SADS-B. Evaluation of the end-to-end latency consists of measuring the opera-
tional latency of the SADS-B prototype in each mode (decrypt and encrypt) follow-
ing the successful verification of the system. Because the design is fully pipelined,
the longest propagation path (in units of clock cycles) can be determined through
static VHDL code analysis. Alternatively, the FPGA component latency can be
measured using a simulation environment as well. However, this does not account
for the overhead latency of the signal propagation within the X310 before and after
the designed SADS-B module.
Therefore, an additional and more robust measurement of operational latency
requires the use of a dual input oscilloscope. In this case, a Teledyne LeCroy Wave-
Pro 760Zi-A is used, according to the setup shown in Figure 40. To perform the
measurement, the signal generator is setup using MATLAB® to generate a valid
ADS-B waveform (previously captured from an Aeroflex IFR 6000), as described in
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Section 4.1.2. However, the primary difference in this case is the N5182B vector sig-
nal generator will not be setup in a repeating mode. Instead, it will perform a sin-
gle playback of the ADS-B waveform upon a trigger button being manually pressed
on the signal generator. The trigger could alternatively be set through an ACPI
commands via MATLAB®. Before playback, the oscilloscope is setup to trigger
appropriate on the input ADS-B preamble reaching a specified power level. Once
triggered, the oscilloscope captures both channels at 40 GSPS. The data is then
manually saved using the interface on oscilloscope to an attached USB drive. The
results are evaluated using MATLAB® plots and manually inspection.
Figure 40. Test setup for end-to-end latency measurement.
The data collection is saved to a local file on the oscilloscope, off-loaded to a
PC and plotted using MATLAB®. Because the captures are synchronized, the la-
tency in seconds is simply a ∆t = ∆s × Fs, where ∆s is the number of samples
between the start of each preamble and Fs is the sample rate of the oscilloscope.
The process is repeated for each mode (encryption and decryption). Finally,
the results are evaluated against the threshold latency of 50ms based on the ADS-B
specification [21].
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4.3.2 Evaluate Performance of SADS-B Components.
Demodulation Error.
Demodulation is evaluated against the lower limit bit error rate (BER) for a
2-PPM signal, which is the same as on-off keying (OOK) and shown in Equation 8.
BER ≥ 1
2
∗ e−Eb/N0 (8)
A Monte Carlo simulation is performed by using the randn in MATLAB® to
generate and add noise to a random stream of bits, according to the various levels
of Eb/N0, the SNR. The BER for the implemented algorithm is evaluated against
the ideal formula curve on a plot of SNR vs. BER.
Preamble Detection Error.
A Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate detection performance, using two
simulations. The first simulation evaluates how well each value of α performs when
a preamble signal is present. It begins with an ideal preamble signal and uses the
randn function within MATLAB® to add additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
to the signal to a specified SNR. Next, the resulting signal is input to the preamble
detector algorithm. The number of correct detections are recorded. This is repeated
for a variety of settings for α. The false negative rate (FNR) is then used to evalu-
ate the performance across different settings of α.
The second simulation is similar, but begins with a half-matching false pream-
ble. The false preamble is a signal with four pulses that align to the preamble pulses.
It also has four pulses that do not align. This is similar to many “8-bit windows”
PPM. Visually, the two general cases where this is possible are shown in Figure 41.
In a normal ADS-B signal, this bit pattern is likely to occur in approximately
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Figure 41. Preamble template aligning with 8 bits from a PPM signal.
12.5% of the time. It will either occur with [1,1,X,0,0,X,X,X] pattern (as discussed
later in Section 3.5), or with a [0,0,X,X,1,1,X,X]. An ‘X’ in these patterns repre-
sents either a ‘1’ or a ‘0’, and are where a pulse is placed for this simulation. Each
of these events have approximately a
1
24
= 6.25% chance to occur, combining to
approximately a 12.5% of either of them occurring in any given 8-bit window in the
ADS-B PPM signal.
If the demodulation results correlate with ideal BER formula given by Equa-
tion 8, then Figure 42 will approximate the minimum Eb/N0 required to receive a
signal error-free 80% of the time.
Let SNRthr be the threshold value of Eb/N0 determined in Figure 42. The
preamble detection results will be used to determine the optimal value of penalty
factor α based on the following criteria:
(1) successful detection of real preambles (TPR) ≥ 90%, ∀Eb/N0 ≥ SNRthr
(2) successful rejection of normal ADS-B signals as preambles (TNR) ≥ 90%,
∀Eb/N0 ≥ SNRthr
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(1− BER)112 = 80%
BER = 1− 112
√
.8
BER = 1.99 ∗ 10−3
BER =
1
2
∗ e−Eb/N0
1
2
∗ e−Eb/N0 = 1.99 ∗ 10−3
Eb/N0 = 5.526
Eb/N0(dB) = 10 ∗ log10 5.526 = 7.424dB
Figure 42. Eb/N0 that will be allow error-free reception 80% of the time.
With these criteria in mind, the maximum allowable false positive rate (FPR)
(1-true negative rate (TNR)) that will satisfy condition (2) is calculated in Figure
43. Therefore a correctly implemented preamble detector will have a FPR ≤ 7.95 ∗
10−3, ∀Eb/N0 ≥ SNRthr.
Let P (FP ) be the probability of false preamble detection across a 112-bit ADS-
B signal. Let P (HM) be the probability of a false preamble detection during
an 8-bit ADS-B signal that matches one of the templates described in Section
4.3.2.
(1− P (FP ))(112−6) = 90%
P (FP ) = 1− 106
√
.9
P (FP ) = 9.935 ∗ 10−4
P (FP ) = P (HM)× FPR
P (HM) = 2× 1
24
= .125
FPR =
9.935 ∗ 10−4
.125
= 7.95 ∗ 10−3
Figure 43. FPR that will allow successful rejection 90% of the time.
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4.4 Performance Results
4.4.1 Operational Latency.
Figure 44. Timing of input sample for SADS-B encryption module.
Figure 44 shows arrival timing of the first preamble sample as input into the
SADS-B encryption module from the DDC on the FPGA. Though not visible, note
that this time is aligned with the rising edge of the clock i_clk when the clock en-
able signal i_clk_en is high.
Figure 45. Timing of input sample for SADS-B encryption module.
Figure 45 shows the output timing of the corresponding output preamble sam-
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ple from the SADS-B encryption module to the DUC on the FPGA. The time is
aligned with the rising edge of i_clk when the output enable signal o_strobe is
high. The resulting latency of the SADS-B module is 144207500 - 19997500 ps =
124.21 µs of latency.
4.4.2 Demodulation Performance.
Figure 46 shows the results from the Monte Carlo simulation of the PPM De-
modulator component of the SADS-B Modules. The same component was used for
encryption and decryption, so the simulation was only performed once. 10,000,000
randomly generated bits (using the randi MATLAB® function) were converted to
their ideal PPM signal, with a pulse value of
√
2 +
√
2i, across the number of sam-
ples. AWGN was added to each sample, according to a specified Eb/N0, by using
the randn MATLAB® function and scaling it. The detection algorithm was then
used to determine the bit value of the PPM signal according to the algorithm dis-
cussed in Section 3.6. The resulting bit was compared to the known vector and the
number of errors was recorded for that particular value of Eb/N0. The results show
that the algorithm performs closely to the ideal BER rate for a 2-PPM signal.
4.4.3 Preamble Detection Characteristics and Performance.
With the demodulation results closely correlating to ideal 2-PPM BER, the
threshold SNRthr = 7.424dB from Section 4.3.2 can be used as an approximation
for the threshold SNR for the criteria for successful preamble detection. Recalling
these criteria, they are:
(1) successful detection of real preambles (TPR) ≥ 90%, ∀Eb/N0 ≥ SNRthr
(2) successful rejection of normal ADS-B signals as preambles (TNR) ≥ 90%,
∀Eb/N0 ≥ SNRthr
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Figure 46. BER results of Monte Carlo simulation.
The first simulation was conducted according to Section 4.3.2 and used 1,000,000
randomly generated samples per trial run. Each sample consists of an ideal PPM
signal with AWGN added using the MATLAB® randn function, scaled to achieve
the desired value of Eb/N0. The results in Figure 47 show the rate at which valid
preambles are succesfully detected (i.e. the true positive rate (TPR)) based on a
corresponding value of Eb/N0. This simulation is repeated across several different
settings for the penalty factor, α, as described by the Equation 6.
From criteria (1) above, the cutoff TPR = 90% at SNRthr = 7.424 dB is shown
by the intersection of the dotted lines in the figure. Curves that pass through the
upper left quadrant meet the criteria from (1) for successful preamble detection. As
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Figure 47. TPR results of Monte Carlo simulation for various α.
shown in Figure 47, only values where 1 ≤ α ≤ 5 stay within the criteria.
The second simulation was also conducted according to Section 4.3.2 and used
1,000,000 randomly generated samples per trial run. Each sample uses a randomly
generated signal template from the false preambles templates, shown in Figure 41,
with noise added using the randn MATLAB® function according to a specified
level of Eb/N0. Figure 48 shows the FPR across different values of Eb/N0, for the
penalty factors 1 ≤ α ≤ 5 which met criteria (1). The cutoff FPR at SNRthr
is shown by the intersection of the dotted lines in the figure. All curves that pass
through the lower left quadrant meet criteria (2) for successful preamble detection.
As shown in Figure 48, the α values of 3,4, and 5 meet the criteria.
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Figure 48. FPR results of Monte Carlo simulation, 1 ≤ α ≤ 5.
4.4.4 FPGA Resource Usage.
The Xilinx Kintex-7 is a fairly modern FPGA, compared to many existing
FPGA components, especially. The overall FPGA resource consumption expressed
by slices, 6-input LUTs, random access memory (RAM) (Kb), shift registers (Kb),
and flip-flops. Table 2 shows the total available for each resource type on the Kintex-
7 (specifically the Kintex-7K410T) onboard the USRP™ X310.
Based on the system design and implementation, Table 3 shows the required
FPGA resource utilization, reflecting the portion of the usage attributable to the
SADS-B encryption module designed during the course of this research, and also
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Table 2. Total Available Kintex-7K410T Resources
Resource Type Quantity Available
Slices 63,550
6-input LUTs 254,200
RAM (Kb) 5,663
Flip-Flops 508,400
the total including the overhead from the inherited USRP™ top level design.
Table 3. Kintex-7K410T Resources Used by SADS-B
Resource Type SADS-B Module Usage Total Prototype Usage
Slices 34,316 54,219
6-input LUTs 121,465 174,560
RAM (Kb) 299 804
Flip-Flops 96192 136,000
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Research Summary
The goal of this research was to prototype and characterize an implementation
of BITW security for the ADS-B system. Given the unique structure and small size
of ADS-B information messages, and based on previous research, the FFX algo-
rithm was implemented on an FPGA-based platform. The prototype was designed,
implemented, and verified using system engineering principles and an incremental
approach.
The components were individually verified through the modeling and simula-
tion, hardware design simulation, and hardware implementation using various tech-
niques. The verification criteria were based on the intended operating environment.
The performance of the system as a whole system was characterized in terms of la-
tency, throughput, and the strength of the detection and demodulation schemes.
The latency and throughput of the system are more than adequate in meeting the
requirements for a transparent BITW security system for ADS-B and would be ex-
pected to perform transparently in an operating context. The FPGA utilization
is sufficient for implementation of a single SADS-B module (encryption or decryp-
tion), but not both on a single USRP™ X310 prototype device without further opti-
mization or utilization of a larger FPGA.
Based on sub-millisecond latency and a verified end-to-end design, the results
of this research suggest that FPE (specifically FFX), when implemented in a BITW
architecture, is a suitable mechanism for layering security onto the existing ADS-B
infrastructure.
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5.2 Future Work
The practical next step in this area of research from a system perspective is
to miniaturize the prototyped SADS-B system for implementation on an opera-
tional Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). To do this, would either be miniaturizing
the HDL design for inclusion in an already existing on-board electronics package, or
reducing the overall size, weight and power required and analyzing the results.
Several cryptographic enhancements or modifications could be be proposed for
use with the current SADS-B prototype. A cryptographic recommendation from
Jochum was to preclude the CRC bits in the message from being included, then re-
calculating them for the new packet/frame prior to transmission [15]. This would
allow the receiver to validate the encrypted SADS-B packet before decryption, pro-
cessing, and transmittal to the ADS-B IN receiving device. The DF-19 military
channel has no readily available specifications for the use of the associated CA
codes. This field could be used in conjuction with a public key infrastructure (PKI)
scheme to securely distributed updated symmetric keys via asymmetric cryptogra-
phy, similar to Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) in the internet space. Additionally (or
alternatively) the addition of an integrity check such as a message authentication
code (MAC) could be included in place of the CRC check or as an augmentation of
it.
The performance standards that built the basis for the preamble detector have
a section on enhanced preamble detection [21]. This material could be used to op-
timize the SADS-B prototype in the decryption configuration to maximize perfor-
mance in the context of closer-to-real-world conditions.
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5.3 Contributions
This research generated a real-time ADS-B prototype with verification results
that supports its operational feasibility and utility. It validated the prototype against
performance requirements specified for ADS-B 1090ES, supporting the feasibility of
adding the SADS-B layer of security on top of ADS-B in a military context.
It also made strides towards a development framework for BITW encryption,
including further enhancements to ADS-B security or BITW implementation in
other communications contexts or applications. This framework includes the con-
tribution more than 4,000 lines of MATLAB®, VHDL, and Verilog code.
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Appendix A.
Figure 49. Frequency response of analog front end on USRP™ SBX-40 daughter-
board.
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